Modelling science trustworthiness under publish or perish pressure by Grimes, David Robert et al.
Modelling science trustworthiness under publish or perish pressure
Grimes, D. R., Bauch, C. T., & Ioannidis , J. P. A. (2018). Modelling science trustworthiness under publish or
perish pressure. Royal Society Open Science, 5, [171511]. DOI: 10.1098/rsos.171511
Published in:
Royal Society Open Science
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
Publisher rights
© 2018 The Authors.
This is an open access article published under a Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/),
which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the author and source are cited.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:06. Aug. 2018
rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org
Research
Cite this article: Grimes DR, Bauch CT,
Ioannidis JPA. 2018 Modelling science
trustworthiness under publish or perish
pressure. R. Soc. open sci. 5: 171511.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.171511
Received: 29 September 2017
Accepted: 1 December 2017
Subject Category:
Mathematics
Subject Areas:
mathematical modelling/computer
modelling and simulation/statistics
Keywords:
research ethics, research fraud, science
trustworthiness, public trust in science,
publish or perish
Author for correspondence:
David Robert Grimes
e-mail: d.r.grimes@qub.ac.uk
Modelling science
trustworthiness under
publish or perish pressure
David Robert Grimes1,2, Chris T. Bauch3 and
John P. A. Ioannidis4,5,6,7,8
1School of Mathematics and Physics, Queen’s University Belfast, BT7 1NN, UK
2Department of Oncology, University of Oxford, Old Road Campus, Oxford OX3 7DQ, UK
3Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Waterloo, 200 University Avenue
W, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3G1
4Meta-Research Innovation Center at Stanford (METRICS), 5Department of Medicine,
6Department of Health Research and Policy, 7Department of Biomedical Data Science,
and 8Department of Statistics, Stanford University, SPRC, MSOB X306, 1265 Welch
Road, Stanford, CA 94305, USA
DRG, 0000-0003-3140-3278; CTB, 0000-0001-6214-6601
Scientific publication is immensely important to the scientific
endeavour. There is, however, concern that rewarding scientists
chiefly on publication creates a perverse incentive, allowing
careless and fraudulent conduct to thrive, compounded by
the predisposition of top-tier journals towards novel, positive
findings rather than investigations confirming null hypothesis.
This potentially compounds a reproducibility crisis in several
fields, and risks undermining science and public trust in
scientific findings. To date, there has been comparatively little
modelling on factors that influence science trustworthiness,
despite the importance of quantifying the problem. We present
a simple phenomenological model with cohorts of diligent,
careless and unethical scientists, with funding allocated by
published outputs. This analysis suggests that trustworthiness
of published science in a given field is influenced by false
positive rate, and pressures for positive results. We find
decreasing available funding has negative consequences for
resulting trustworthiness, and examine strategies to combat
propagation of irreproducible science.
1. Introduction
In academia, the phrase ‘publish or perish’ is more than a
pithy witticism—it reflects the reality that researchers are under
immense pressure to continuously produce outputs, with career
advancement dependent upon them [1,2]. Academic publications
are deemed a proxy for scientific productivity and ability,
and with an increasing number of scientists competing for
funding, the previous decades have seen an explosion in the
2018 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted
use, provided the original author and source are credited.
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rate of scientific publishing [3]. Yet while output has increased dramatically, increasing publication
volume does not imply that the average trustworthiness of publications has improved. As science pivots
on replicable findings, for the purposes of this work we define a trustworthy finding as one that can be
replicated independently, corresponding to a true positive or negative. A previous paper by Ioannidis [4]
has outlined the reasons why many published research findings are false, and the dubious use of p-values
for significance in research findings has of late been widely discussed [5–9]. Across much of experimental
science from psychology [10] to biomedical science [11–13] and cancer research [14], there is concern over
an apparent reproducibility crisis.
Despite their vital importance in conveying accurate science, top-tier journals possess a limited
number of publication slots and are thus overwhelmingly weighted towards publishing only novel or
significant results. Despite the fact that null results and replications are important scientific contributions,
the reality is that journals do not much care for these findings. Researchers are not rewarded for
submitting these findings nor for correcting the scientific record, as high-profile examples attest [15,16].
This pressure to produce positive results may function as a perverse incentive. Edwards & Roy [17]
argue that such incentives encourage a cascade of questionable findings and false positives. Heightened
pressure on academics has created an environment where ‘Work must be rushed out to minimize
the danger of being scooped’ [18]. The range of questionable behaviour itself is wide [19]. Classic
‘fraud’ (falsification, fabrication and plagiarism (FFP) [20]) may be far less important than more subtle
questionable research practices, which might include selective reporting of (dependent) variables, failure
to disclose experimental conditions and unreported data exclusions [21].
So how common are such practices? A study of National Institute of Health (NIH)-funded early and
mid-career scientists (n= 3247) found that within the previous 3 years, 0.3% admitted to falsification of
data, 6% to a failure to present conflicting evidence and a worrying 15.5% to changing of study design,
methodology or results in response to funder pressure [22]. An overview by Fanelli [23] has shown
that questionable research practices are as common as 75%, while fraud per se occurs only in 1–3%
of scientists. These findings are alarming, yet quantification of these perverse incentives is vital if we
are to understand the potential extent of the underlying problem, and formulate strategies to address
it. This is an underdeveloped area, but one which is slowly growing—recent works by Smaldino &
McElreath [24,25] have employed elegant dynamic models to demonstrate that even when there is no
attempts at fraud or untoward research practices, selection based solely on published output tends to
produce poorer methods and higher false discovery rates, a phenomenon they term ‘the natural selection
of bad science’.
Suboptimal science and fraud can take myriad forms which renders it difficult to detect [26]. For
the purposes of this article, we define fraud as an explicit ‘intention to deceive’ [27]. A more recent
investigation [23] put the weighted mean percentage of scientists committing research fraud as high as
1.97%, with over a third admitting to questionable research practices. The same investigation found that
about 14.12% of scientists reported observing fraudulent research behaviour in colleagues. Another study
[28] found that 5% of responding authors claimed to be personally aware of fabricated or misrepresented
data in a trial they had participated in. A study of bio-statisticians [29] found that over half of respondents
reported being aware of research misconduct.
A 2012 [30] analysis found that FFP offenses rather than honest error accounted for 67.4% of retracted
publications, with the rate of retraction due to fraud increasing 10-fold since 1975. An important question
is whether scientists who are unethical (fraudulent) or sloppy (careless) may thrive and even outperform
diligent scientists in a system driven by publish or perish pressure. As it is impossible to identify all
unethical and careless scientists, one can perform mathematical modelling of science under different
assumptions and find out how these scientists fare and what the implications are for the overall
trustworthiness of science.
To better understand the impact of publish or perish on scientific research, and to garner insight
into what practices drive the trustworthiness of published science is of paramount importance if we
are to counteract any detrimental impacts of such practices. In this work, we present a simple but
instructive model of scientific publishing trustworthiness under the assumption that researchers are
rewarded for their published output, taking account of field-specific differences and the proportion of
resources allocated with funding cycle. The factors that influence resultant trustworthiness in simulation
are quantified and discussed, as well as implications for improving the trustworthiness of scientific
publishing. It is important to note that the motivations of scientists and ecosystem of scientific publishing
are inherently complex, and we do not expect the model discussed to be deterministically predictive—
rather, the model is presented as a tool for allowing us to formulate publication dynamics in a population
of scientists in a formal and precise way, subject to certain caveats.
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2. Model outline
2.1. Basic model and assumptions
To construct a simple model of publication rewards, we define the total amount of available funding for
research as R(t). Per unit of funding in a given field, there is a global discovery rate of DR, which includes
a proportion pT of positive/significant results, a proportion pF of false positives, and a proportion n
of null results. Null results in principle can include both true negatives and false negatives, but given
the bias towards positive results we will not discriminate between these two in this investigation. The
relative proportion of positives and nulls will be inherently field-specific—certain disciplines will be
more prone to false positives, while others tend to yield less ambiguous results. As the quantities are
proportions, we have that
pT + pF + n= 1. (2.1)
In certain fields, the false positive rate may be high, and so diligent researchers take measures to falsify
positive results and test their results multiple times. Even when research groups are very diligent,
they may occasionally happen upon a false or misleading result which is hard to eliminate and due to
experimental or theoretical difficulty rather than carelessness. For the diligent cohort, this will be as low
as can reasonably be achieved and so we state they submit a small fraction, , of their false positives for
publication. Researchers exist on a spectrum, but for simplicity we may broadly sub-divide this spectrum
into three distinct classes.
(i) Diligent cohort. This group take pains to replicate experiments and do not dishonestly manipulate
results. Their false positive submission fraction is , thus as low as reasonably possible. They
account for a fraction fD of the initial total, and parameters relating to them have subscript D.
(ii) Careless cohort. This group do not falsify results, but are much less careful at eliminating spurious
positive results. They may also have questionable practices that lead them to false positives. As
a result, they have a false positive submission rate of c where c> 1. They account for a fraction
fC of the initial total, and parameters relating to them have subscript C.
(iii) Unethical cohort. This group appear broadly similar to the diligent group, but with one crucial
difference in that they may occasionally manipulate data or knowingly submit dubious results
at a rate of δ beyond global discovery rate. For convenience, instead of defining a higher value of
DR in this group to account for the higher ‘discovery’ rate, we retain the same parameter value of
DR for the unethical cohort but allow pT + pF + n + δ > 1, so that their realized ‘discovery’ rate
is higher than the other groups. They account for a fraction fU of the initial total, and parameters
relating to them have subscript U.
The funding held by the diligent cohort at a given time is x(t), with y(t) held by the careless cohort
and z(t) by the unethical cohort, so that
x(t) + y(t) + z(t) =R(t). (2.2)
With these assumptions, we can model the theoretical impact of a paradigm where researchers are
rewarded with funding and success in direct relation to their publication output. As outlined in the
Introduction, there is huge pressure on scientists to submit positive or ‘novel’ findings, while findings
confirming the null hypothesis are frequently side-lined. Under such a selection pressure, all researchers
will aim to submit their significant positive results for publication. The respective rates of submission
per unit funding for the diligent, careless and unethical cohorts are accordingly
⎛
⎜⎝SD+SC+
SU+
⎞
⎟⎠=DR
⎛
⎜⎝ pT + pFpT + cpF
pT + pF + δ
⎞
⎟⎠ (2.3)
The rate at which null results are submitted is less clear—in general, there is a significant bias in
publication towards significant results. As a consequence, negative findings are often shunned by high-
impact journals, and scientists are disinclined to submit them, meaning that potentially important null
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results may not ever see the light of publication, the so-called ‘file drawer’ problem. We assume that each
cohort submit only a fraction of their null results in the proportions βD, βC, βU such that⎛
⎜⎝SD−SC−
SU−
⎞
⎟⎠=DRn
⎛
⎜⎝βDβC
βU
⎞
⎟⎠ . (2.4)
Equations (2.1)–(2.4) comprise the researcher-specific parameters, and we must further quantify the
journal-specific elements also. Competition for space in field-specific top-tier journals is fierce, and we
denote the combined carrying-capacity of these field-specific top-tier journals as J(t). These journals
exhibit a clear bias towards positive results, with a positive-publication weighing fraction of published
articles, B, describing significant results. Thus, presuming that more submissions are obtained than can
be published, we can quantify the probability that a positive result (νP(t)) or a negative result (νN(t)) is
published. These probabilities are given by
(
νP(t)
νN(t)
)
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
JB
x(t)SD+ + y(t)SC+ + z(t)SU+
J(1 − B)
x(t)SD− + y(t)SC− + z(t)SU−
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ . (2.5)
From this, we can then yield an expression for the publication rate per unit of funding for the diligent,
careless and unethical cohorts, which are, respectively,⎛
⎜⎝LD(t)LC(t)
LU(t)
⎞
⎟⎠= νP(t)
⎛
⎜⎝SD+SC+
SU+
⎞
⎟⎠+ νN(t)
⎛
⎜⎝SD−SC−
SU−
⎞
⎟⎠ . (2.6)
The average rate of publications per unit of funding per unit time in top-tier journals for a given field
is thus
A(t) = J
x(t) + y(t) + z(t) . (2.7)
If researchers are rewarded with funding based solely on their published output, we can quantify the
impact of this with time by employing a recursive series solution at discrete time steps, corresponding
to funding cycles. If funding is allocated to each cohort based upon their output at the beginning of the
previous funding cycling, and we assume total funding remains constant (dR/dt= 0) then the funding
available for each cohort at each successive time step is
⎛
⎜⎝x(t + 1)y(t + 1)
z(t + 1)
⎞
⎟⎠=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
LD(t)
A(t)
x(t)
LC(t)
A(t)
y(t)
LU(t)
A(t)
z(t)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
. (2.8)
2.2. Variable funding resources
We also consider the fact that the total amount of funding may not remain constant, so we may model
the impact of changing funding scenarios. For simplicity, we assume it changes at some constant rate G,
which can be negative (for diminishing funding, the likes of which might occur with a decrease in NIH
or EU funding budgets), zero (for constant funding, as in equation (2.8)) or positive (increasing funding).
New funding is allocated at random in proportions reflecting the typical make-up of new researchers,
and accordingly the refined equations are
⎛
⎜⎝x(t + 1)y(t + 1)
z(t + 1)
⎞
⎟⎠=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
LD(t)
A(t)
x(t) + fDG
LC(t)
A(t)
y(t) + fCG
LU(t)
A(t)
z(t) + fUG
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
. (2.9)
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2.3. Research fraud detection
For unethical researchers, we can look at a slightly more complicated scenario where dubious
publications have a probability of detection leading to denial of funding, η. We further assume this
penalization only applies to dubious results which were published rather than just submitted. If this
consideration is taken into account, then we modify the last part of equation (2.9) to reflect this so that
z(t + 1) =
(
LU(t)
A(t)
− DRηδνp(t)
)
z(t) + fUG. (2.10)
2.4. Rewarding diligence
The diligent cohort have intrinsically lower submission rates than other groups, and consequently are
more likely to suffer under a publish or perish regime, despite the importance of their reproducible work.
To counteract this, it has been suggested that rewarding diligence might counteract this trend [31,32]. We
might envision an ideal situation where scientific works are audited for reproducibility by independent
bodies, with groups who keep their reproducibility high and error rates below a certain unavoidable
threshold (given by DRνP) garnering a reward of RW. This in practice could only be achieved by the
diligent cohort, and in the most simple case, their funding resources are given by
x(t + 1) = LD(t)
A(t)
x(t) + fDG + RW. (2.11)
2.5. Counteracting publication bias
It is also possible to envision a situation where journals do not give any preference to positive results over
null results. In this case, we would expect researchers to submit all their results so that βD = βC = βU = 1.
In this case, νP and νN are replaced by a single function of time ν, given by
ν(t) = J
x(t)(SD+ + SD−) + y(t)(SC+ + SC−) + z(t)(SU+ + SU−)
. (2.12)
2.6. Trustworthiness of published science
Finally, we define a metric for the trustworthiness of published science, defined as the proportion of
reproducible results, T(t). This is given by
T(t) = 1 − νpDR(x(pF) + y(cpF) + z(pF + δ))
J
, (2.13)
where the time arguments of x,y,z and νp have been excluded for clarity.
2.7. Parameter estimation and assumptions
To simulate the trends that would occur under these assumptions requires that we select appropriate
parameters (these are detailed in table 1), which are used in all simulations unless otherwise stated in
the text. It can be seen through inspection that discovery rate per unit resource DR cancels in the analysis
for x(t), y(t), z(t) and T(t), and accordingly this can be ascribed any real positive value without skewing
analysis. When there is no fraud detection funding penalization (η = 0), journal carrying capacity J also
cancels in the analysis and does not impact results. Initially we assume also that G= 0 so that funding
levels remain constant.
Estimation of fraudulent submission fraction per unit resource δ requires some elaboration, as this
is notoriously difficult to ascertain and field-specific. A 1996 analysis by Fuchs & Westervelt [33]
extrapolated from known cases to estimate that approximately 0.01% of published papers were
fraudulent, though this is considered exceptionally conservative [27]. Empirical estimates of plagiarism
vary markedly from 0.02 to 25% of all publications [26]. The frequency of paper retractions from the
PubMed database for misconduct is about 0.02%, suggesting that fraud might be present in 0.02–0.2%
of papers therein [34]. An investigation in the Journal of Cell Biology found inappropriate image-
manipulation occurring in 1% of papers [35]. More alarmingly perhaps, a 1992 data audit by the United
States Food and Drug Administration found deficiencies a in 10–20% of studies published between 1977
and 1990, with 2% of investigators deemed guilty of severe scientific misconduct [23,36,37].
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Table 1. Parameters for initial simulations. Values in this table comprise the default initial assumptions, which are varied to investigate
different conditions, as outlined in the respective relevant section.
parameter value
journal carrying capacity (J) 120/cycle
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
total discovery rate per unit funding (DR) 15
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
initial proportion diligent researchers (fD) 0.65 [23]
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
initial proportion careless researchers (fC) 0.33 [23]
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
initial proportion unethical researchers (fU) 0.02 [23]
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
reasonable error rate () 0.05 [9]
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
fraudulent submission rate per unit resource (δ) 0.0574
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
positive publication bias (B) 0.9
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
multiplicative factor for careless cohort—(c) 2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
null/negative submission rates—(βD/βC/βU) 0.40
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
resource growth rate—(G) 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
fraud detection proportion—(η) 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
field-specific true positive fraction (pT) 0.2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
field-specific false positive fraction (pF) 0.2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
For the purposes of this work, we will assume that FFP violations are present in 1% of the published
literature so that JF = J/100. Defining xo = x(0), yo = y(0), zo = z(0) and νpO = νp(0), then for any selected
values of DR and J, we can readily define the required rate by
δ = JF(xoSD+ + yoSC+ + zoDR(pT + pF))
zoDR(BJ − JF)
. (2.14)
This is dependent on the true/false positive of the field, and we initially take an optimistic assumption
that the 1% of published fraud occurs in fields with high levels of false positives, and will be less in fields
with less ambiguity in results, so that the same value of δ is used for all simulations. This is calculated
assuming pF = 0.32 and pT = 0.08 so that δ = 0.057 as per table 1. The reasonable error rate is taken from p-
value for significance, as discussed in Colquhoun [9]. Strictly speaking, Prof. Colquhoun puts forward an
eloquent argument in the cited work that p< 0.05 is a frequently abused metric, leading to false positives.
For simplicity, however, we will presume that  = 0.05 reflects best reasonable practice in this simulation.
3. Results
3.1. Impact of the field-specific false positive rate
Figure 1 shows the change in funding proportions with time for each cohort in a field with a low rate of
false positives (pF/(pT + pF) = 0.25) and a field with a high rate of false positives (pF/(pT + pF) = 0.8).
What is immediately evident is that in fields where false positives comprise the bulk of positive
results, the trustworthiness of published science suffers markedly, and careless and unethical cohorts
are disproportionately rewarded at the expense of diligent researchers. Simulation results suggests that
the trustworthiness of published science in any given field is strongly dependent on the false positive
rate in that field under a publish or perish paradigm. As evidenced by the figure, outputs from diligent
research and the number of trustworthy results still decline even when FPR is low with publish or perish
incentives, as suggested by Smaldino & McElreath [24].
3.2. Impact of funding growth rate
As depicted in figure 2. The increasing of available funds (G) has the net effect of reducing publication
pressure by bring down the average number of publications expected per unit funding, provided
journal capacity stays roughly constant, reducing the likelihood of dubious publications being selected.
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Figure 1. The impact offield-specific falsepositive rateon resources allocatedand science trustworthiness. Panel (a) depicts theprojected
funding allocations in a field where false positives are relatively rare (pT = 0.32, pF = 0.08). By contrast, (b) shows the impact on
resources consumed when false positives are the norm (pT = 0.08, pF = 0.32). In (c), the trustworthiness (proportion of reproducible
science) for both scenarios are depicted, indicating false positive rate highly drives the trustworthiness of scientific publication in a given
field.
Conversely, reducing funding increases the publication pressure and results in increased selection of
suspect works and a fall in scientific reproducibility. The implications of this require some elaboration
and are considered in the Discussion section.
3.3. Impact of increased fraud detection
Figure 3 depicts the impact of aggressive fraud detection (η) and punishment. Increased fraud detection
seems to improve science trustworthiness, but η has to be very high in practice to have a substantial
impact on the proportion of funding allocated to unethical cohorts. Negating growth, the funding
allocation to this group would only be expected to decrease with time if
η >
1
DRδνP
(
LU
A
− 1
)
. (3.1)
In practice, this is quite high, and for the values in table 1, a value of η > 0.7688 would be required to
fully diminish funding to this cohort in time.
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Figure 2. The impact of funding increases and decreases on funding allocation and science trustworthiness. Panels (a–c) depict the
absolute proportion of funding resources allocated to diligent, careless and unethical cohorts, respectively, when funding changes at
rates of 0, 5 and−5 per cycle.
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Figure 4. The impact of rewarding researcher for diligence. This improves the proportion of funding allocated to diligent researchers,
but to improve science trustworthiness still requires non-zero values of η under this schema.
3.4. Impact of rewarding diligence
By inspection, it is straightforward to show that for the amount of funding held by the diligent cohort to
stay the same or increase, then the condition on RW is
RW ≥
(
1 − LD(t)
A(t)
)
x(t) − fDG, (3.2)
though in practice for most situations, RW will have to be much greater than this minimum value. For
the example depicted in figure 4, a large reward for diligence (RW = 10) substantially increases the funds
awarded to the diligent cohort. However, reproducibility still falls slowly if the unethical cohort is not
removed. It is possible to both reward diligence and punish fraud, which can improve trustworthiness,
as illustrated in figure 4.
3.5. Impact of the positive publication weighing
To simulate how published science fares under the rather artificial fixation of top-tier journals with
positive novel results, figure 5 depicts how funding is allocated and science trustworthiness changes with
varying values for B. In this simulation, βD = βC = βD = 0.5 when publications were B 0.5 (skewed
towards positive publication). For the scenario where null and positive results were equally likely to be
published, null results were as likely to be published so all were submitted and thus the fraction of null
results submitted, respectively, were βD = βC = βD = 1. Higher values of B lead to perverse rewarding
of false positives and fraudulent results at the expense of diligent science. Best outcome for science
trustworthiness was observed when journals were simulated as completely agnostic to findings.
3.6. Impact of initial unethical funding proportion
Figure 6 depicts the sensitivity of trustworthiness to different assumptions of initial unethical
funding proportion zo. As might be expected, increasing zo has negative implications for published
trustworthiness.
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Figure 5. The impact of positive publication weighing on the trustworthiness of published science. (a–c) Show funding allocation 95%,
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Science trustworthiness of all these scenarios in shown in figure (e), suggesting best trustworthiness obtained when journals were
completely agnostic to whether a result was positive or null.
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to unethical cohorts, the better the resultant science trustworthiness.
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4. Discussion
The model presented is a simplification of a complex ecosystem, but gives some insight into what factors
shape scientific trustworthiness. The model suggests that a fixation in top-tier journals on significant or
positive findings tends to drive trustworthiness of published science down, and is more likely to select for
false positives and fraudulent results. In our simulations, best outcome was obtained by simply paying
no heed to whether a result was significant or not. This is akin to the model used by many emerging open
access peer-reviewed journals such as PLoS ONE, who have a policy of accepting any work provided
it is scientifically rigorous. Our simulation suggests this model of publishing should improve science
trustworthiness, and it is encouraging that many other publishers are taking this approach too, including
Royal Society Open Science and Nature Scientific Reports. As of 2017, Scientific Reports has surpassed PLoS
ONE as the world’s biggest mega-journal [38]. However, there is an important point to consider in the
form of the parameter J (the publication carrying-capacity). This can be highly field-specific, comprising
the top-tier journals in that specific field. In general, these publications are focused on prestige rather than
rapid dissemination of science and it is unlikely these journals would move to replicate the approach of
rapid open-access publishers. Accordingly, the suggestion that top-tier journals might aspire to treat all
studies, regardless of their results, as equally worthy of publication is likely to be an unworkable ideal.
Indeed, there is still a perception that such journals are for ‘trivial’ or unimportant results, and
that positive or important results should still go to a few journals with extreme competition for
space. Empirical evaluations show that small studies published in top-impact journals have markedly
exaggerated results on average compared with similar studies on the same questions published in
journals of lesser impact factor [39]. This suggests that the pressure to publish in these flagship journals
may still be very real, despite the option of publishing in less competitive journals. The analysis here
suggests that science trustworthiness is affected too by changes in funding resources, and that when an
increase of funding improves the overall trustworthiness of science, as depicted in figure 2. Conversely
when this is diminished, the increased competition on scientists appears to create conditions when
false positives and dubious results are more likely to be selected for and rewarded. This is a natural
consequence of the model, but requires careful interpretation. Crucially, it is important to note that there
is no mechanism in the model for unethical or careless researchers to transition into diligent scientists.
Rather, decreasing funding increases competition, and amplifies the career advantages of questionable
findings. Conversely, if global funding rates are increased, then competition for resources decreases and
the advantage of suspect findings is somewhat mitigated. While beyond the scope of this work, such a
prediction could be empirically tested by analysing situations when research budgets change markedly,
such as the doubling of the NIH budget from 1998 to 2003.
The model presented pivots on the assumption of a scenario that publication is the dominant metric
upon which scientists are rewarded, and elucidates the potential consequences of such a situation. It is
important to note this is a substantial simplification, and there are other metrics by which scientists
are assessed, including other measures of impact, awards and citations. However, the number of
publications attributed to a scientist has a marked effect on their career success, with more publications
associated with principal investigator status, and acquisition of funding [40]. The average number of
authors per paper is increasing over time, and this is not just due to more interdisciplinary work, but also
due to a greater demand for having more papers in one’s CV [41]. The model also implicitly assumes
that output is an approximately linear function of funding in a given field. The exact applicability
of this assumption may vary across fields. For example, wet-lab sciences require a certain threshold
of continuous funding just to operate, whereas computational or theoretical sciences may be able to
operate with comparatively little funding. Presuming direct comparison of researchers and their teams
across a given field, however, the assumption of direct correspondence between resources and outputs
is reasonable, although outliers are to be expected.
One curious result persistently seen in the model was that diligent researchers are unfairly affected
by careless or unethical conduct, with avoidable false positives or unethical publications garnering
disproportionate reward at their expense. Simply increasing fraud detection does not do much to stop
this, as careless researchers benefit from the gap in the market, out-producing their diligent colleagues,
as shown in figure 3. This appears to be an unfortunate and seemingly unavoidable consequence of a
‘publish or perish’ system. However, in good scientific environments carelessness would be sooner or
later detected and potentially penalized. We can estimate how much of a penalty for carelessness or
reward for diligence we need so as to inverse the worsening trends that we observe, by manipulating
equations similar to the manner outlined for unethical conduct. However, this approach risks being
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ruthlessly punitive, punishing honest mistakes with the same severity reserved for the most egregious
abuses of scientific trust.
While a penalty for carelessness has intuitive appeal, distinguishing between honest and careless
errors is fraught with difficulty. As has been argued elsewhere [31,32], rewarding diligence is perhaps
a better way to ensure researchers do not suffer for good conduct. A simple model of this is shown in
figure 4, and indeed this suggests rewarding diligence improves the proportion of funding allocated
to diligent groups. However, it requires some penalty for bad conduct to keep unethical cohorts from
benefiting at the expense of others. In practice, this level of detection appears to have to be relatively
high, which of course would require considerable resources to achieve. It should be noted too that the
false positive rate of a field has a significant impact on science trustworthiness, as illustrated in figure 1.
A high type II error rate provides ample cover for the small minority of unethical researchers to cheat
without overt fear of detection [23,27], perhaps explaining the elevated prevalence of dubious practice
in biomedical science [23], in particular.
The model presented is a much simplified picture of reality, but it allows us to examine how different
factors might influence the trustworthiness of published science, and potentially suggest strategies to
improve it. As the motivations of and pressures on scientists are incredibly complex, it is important to
recognize the limitations in the model too. The three cohorts presented here would in reality constitute
a spectrum. The sub-divisions in this work are relatively arbitrary and informed by the available
data on researcher populations, though it would be easily possible to extend this to consider more
subpopulations if desired. Scientific conduct is notoriously difficult to quantify, and the assumptions
we have used in this work reflect the best estimates to date [23].
We can also envision a situation where authors are awarded solely on the basis of positive findings, so
that negative findings have no funding benefit. We can apply the model to these circumstances too, with
the realization that under such a scheme, there would be no incentive for authors to submit negative
results. In this case, B= 1 and all β terms reduce to zero. Essentially then, one gets a similar result to
the one shown in figure 5a, with even further reduction in trustworthiness. Finally, measures that can be
adopted to begin changing the culture of fixation on novel positive results include the establishment of
awards by academic societies designed to recognize methodological rigour rather than positive results,
as well as the explicit recognition of material published in online repositories as relevant material in
university tenure and promotion guidelines.
It is also worth considering how the positive publication weighing might impact on the ‘file-
drawer’ problem [42]. This was the observation first articulated by Rosenthal in 1979 that researchers
tended to not invest their energy trying to publish null findings, instead burying them in a file-
drawer. The great tragedy of this is that essential null results are often disregarded by the scientists
who discover them, meaning others labour down fruitless avenues. In the model, we have implicitly
assumed a version of this by assuming researchers submit only a portion of their negative findings (β)
for consideration. It would be useful to know precisely how much is never submitted, and to gauge
the extent of the file-drawer problem. Certainly estimates have been made in some fields, notably by
Franco et al. [43], who determined that in one study of publications in social sciences, only 35% of
the null results were ever written up (in good agreement with our estimates for β in table 1) and
ultimately, just over 20.8% of these findings were published. Also for NIH-funded clinical trials, 32%
remained unpublished a median of 51 months after their completion [44]. Whether these patterns apply
also in other fields remains to be seen. One approach might be to consider the issue from an energy-
expenditure point of view or game-theory approach which could be coupled with the model to estimate
how much vital science never reaches the public domain, though this is beyond the scope of this
investigation.
A more sophisticated future analysis might include variables that respond to the available funding.
For example, the fraudulent publication rate δ is treated as a constant in this work for the most
part, but it is easy to imagine a situation where this increases with shrinking funding, or where the
number of investigators willing to engage in such practices is a function of available funding. This
is not considered here, but the model presented could be easily adapted to probe this further. Future
work with more sophisticated models could explore how best to implement these and other possible
interventions designed to improve science trustworthiness. For instance, trustworthiness as a function of
positive publication bias (B) and fraud detection rate (η) could be computed and optimization approaches
could be applied to determine the optimal combination of B and η to improve science trustworthiness.
These parameters can be somewhat influenced by large academic societies, government agencies or
independent foundations for instance, who could fund efforts to detect fraud in published work and
support research concerning null results.
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It is also important to note that the model results pivot explicitly on the assumption that scientists
are forced to operate under a ‘publish or perish’ regime, and rewarded solely on output. Thus, there
is another way to improve the trustworthiness of published science—while publications are indeed
one measure of productivity, they are not necessarily the sole measure. While a much harder aspect
to gauge, trustworthiness is more fundamentally important. For their part, scientific journals should
realize that issues such as replication and null findings are equally vital to good science as eye-catching
‘new’ results. This is slowly beginning to be recognized, with some groups coming to the forefront of
championing reproducible research methods [45]. The consequences detailed in this manuscript only
arise when publishing quantity is the dominant measure of an academic’s worth, but in reality this
should only be one consideration among many. The model suggests that if publishing is the sole criteria
under which academics are judged, then dubious conduct can thrive.
We accordingly need to address alternative ways to assess researchers, and to encourage judicious
diligence over dubious publishing. The model outlined here is far from complete, but yields some
insights into the factors that shape the trustworthiness of published science. There is already evidence
that pressure to publish is driving researcher burn-out and cynicism in published research [46],
negatively affecting both research and the researchers themselves [47,48]. Other studies have not found a
clear association of some productivity incentives with bias [49], but these incentives may be confounded
in that sometimes they coexist with other features and research practices that tend to increase also quality
of research, rather than just quantity of publications. Crucially, bogus findings risk undermining public
confidence in science. Among notable examples [50–52], the fraudulent Lancet MMR-Autism paper [53]
is especially infamous, remaining a cornerstone of anti-vaccine narratives [54].
Scientific publishing is not intrinsically flawed, and complete, unbiased publication is essential for
scientific progress. This work illuminates potential consequences of a system where publication is the
dominating measure of academic success, and strongly suggests we should consider the consequences
of our incentives, and look at changing how academics are evaluated. This is key not only to appreciating
the exceptional pressures wrought upon researchers by a strict publish or perish imposition, but to
improving science itself. This would not only benefit those working in the field, but is crucial if public
trust in science is to be maintained.
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